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In this article I show how ideas and practices of ‘green economy’ can
reproduce and even naturalise inequality in water access for local
users. Evidence to support my argument is drawn from the Waterberg
region in the Limpopo Province of South Africa. Following the
demise of apartheid and the appeal of the green economy, the
Waterberg has been ‘reinvented’ as a wildlife destination. Whereas
game farms enjoy secure water supply, the rural poor relocated to the
small town of Vaalwater suffer severe water shortages. The article
questions the mainstream view according to which game farms have
no relationship to the water problems in town. Rather, I suggest that
by conceiving and managing water as a private commodity deriving
from land ownership and largely unregulated by the state, green
economy initiatives contribute both materially and discursively to
hampering more equality in water redistribution.
Keywords: water; inequality; private game farms; South Africa;
agrarian political economy
Introduction
The Waterberg Biosphere Reserve is a magical part of South Africa which is
easily accessible from Africa’s industrial powerhouse, Gauteng. It is very old, and
yet a very new place too. With its unique history of sparse human settlement, it
has been perfectly placed to reinvent itself, following the dawn of democracy in
South Africa, as a stunningly beautiful and highly signiﬁcant conservation area.1
These few opening lines of an attractive brochure aimed at guiding tourists
through the meanders of the Waterberg plateau dirt roads perfectly sketches the
contours of the myth on which the production of this area as a wildlife destination
rests. Although it provides traces of human presence from thousands of years ago,
it was only in the second half of the 19th century that a handful of white settlers
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occupied this part of Northern Transvaal (today Limpopo) permanently. According
to the myth, this ‘unique’ population dynamic – partly explained by the difﬁcult
environmental conditions of the plateau, bounded by the Waterberg escarpment –
contributed to the preservation of the place as an ‘unspoilt wilderness’ and ade-
quately demonstrates why it was ‘perfectly placed’ to respond to the appeal of the
‘green economy’ mostly via private conservation activities, such as game farms
and nature reserves.2 The advertising board at the entrance of the local Spar invites
visitors to ‘Relax. You’re in The Bush.’ Surely, this is what Pretoria and Johannes-
burg residents, who stop in the small town of Vaalwater after a three-hour drive to
buy the last supplies for a weekend getaway – but also international tourists who
ﬁnally stretch their legs after having been picked up at OR Tambo International
Airport – often do. In order to reach their destinations (be it a luxurious lodge or a
self-catering cottage), they do not need to drive around the dusty and crowded
streets of the local township of Leseding. By staring at the vast stretches of hilly
bushveld landscape – always fenced – outside their car windows and making a
couple of game sightings, their dream of being at one with nature is enacted.
Since the very purpose of this brochure and other popular publications, which
have recently appeared on the Waterberg,3 is to forge and convey a simple story
to tourists, they tend to overlook possible elements of tension, such as the fact that
most of the game that can be admired in the region today was actually reintro-
duced over the past 30 years. Above all, the myth about the Waterberg being
essentially a conservation area tends to disembed it from the agrarian political
economy of the place as shaped by colonialism and apartheid. By putting
conservation back into its agrarian context, we can see how it inﬂuences the redis-
tribution of natural resources and determines who is winning and who is losing
from these green development processes.
In this article I focus on water to show how speciﬁc ideas and practices of
green economy can reproduce and even naturalise inequality in access for local
users. Whereas on private nature reserves and game farms water must be abun-
dant in order to guarantee that the demands of landowners, tourists and wildlife
are satisﬁed, water provision in Vaalwater can be interrupted to the point where
the minimum standards for basic water provision are not met. This situation is
especially affecting the black and poor population of Leseding, where people
are progressively relocating from private farms and the rural villages in the
former Bantustan of Lebowa.
The article questions the mainstream view according to which game farms
are saving water and do not have a relationship with the water problems experi-
enced in town. Rather, I suggest that they do consume water and contribute both
materially and discursively to hamper more equality in water redistribution.
More speciﬁcally I identify three ways in which private nature conservation is
actively reproducing water inequality in the Waterberg: by conceiving and
managing water as a commodity deriving from land ownership: by being
excepted from state regulation; and by excluding local black people (except as
labour) from its project of social production of space.
The quotation opening this section argues for a compelling linkage between
democracy, transformation (‘reinvention’) and nature conservation. From a water
political economy perspective, however, the transformation taking place in the
Waterberg appears to be fundamentally conservative, insomuch as local power
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relations remain unchallenged and private control over natural resources
(especially land and water) is tightened. It is here that I see the main reason
why water redistribution is currently failing in the plateau, as opposed to the
lack of municipal capacity argument dominating the country’s public discourse
both at the national and local level.
The data presented in the article were collected during a one-year period of
ﬁeldwork in the Waterberg plateau, carried out between August 2013 and
August 2014. I engaged with Vaalwater and Leseding residents and with owners
and managers of private nature reserves and game farms through a combination
of social research methods.
The rest of the article is structured in three major sections. First, I situate my
contribution within the debates on the changing agrarian political economy of
South Africa and the social consequences of private conservation initiatives.
Second, I brieﬂy sketch the history of the production of the Waterberg as a con-
servation site and point out some recent trends in this on-going process. Finally,
I analyse water inequality in the Waterberg by considering the speciﬁc ways in
which game farms and private nature reserves reproduce and naturalise it.
Situating water within agrarian political economy debates
The Waterberg falls within the borders of former white rural South Africa,
where the land-water nexus is paramount. Being dependent upon access to land,
the distribution of water resources is similarly deeply unequal and skewed along
racial lines.4 For this reason it is crucial to situate our discussion on water
access within a broader debate on the agrarian political economy of the place,
revolving around issues of land, labour and livelihoods. In this way I also intend
to problematise a tendency in South African public discourse towards establish-
ing dualisms – in this context, farm vs town(ship) – by unravelling the historical
and present-day relationships between people and spaces.5
One of the most important lines of enquiry to recently emerge in the ﬁeld of
critical agrarian studies refers to the new phenomenon of land and resource
accumulation known as ‘grabbing’.6 In the course of the years authors have
moved beyond a focus on agriculture alone as the main driver of land grabs to
conceptualise the notions of ‘green grabbing’ and ‘water grabbing’.7 Green grab-
bing has been deﬁned as a dynamic of accumulation (by powerful actors) and
dispossession (of poor and marginalised communities) for declared environmen-
tal purposes. What is qualitatively new about this process is that it takes place
in a context where environmental concerns have become mainstream – the very
notion of green economy being a case in point – and nature is commodiﬁed to
provide new avenues both for capital accumulation and to ‘repair’ environmen-
tal loss (in line with the notion of neoliberal conservation).8 Water grabbing, on
the other hand, has been identiﬁed as an issue apart, to emphasise the fact that,
without secure access to water, agricultural land has no value but also to point
out that water itself can be the object of grabbing (especially in relation to
hydropower and mining projects).9 Water is ﬂuid in time and space, however,
and this makes it more difﬁcult to reallocate control over it as well as to evalu-
ate the social consequences of the grabbing.
The scholarship on land and resource grabbing cautions us that, although
these are to be interpreted as global phenomena related to the contemporary
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phase of neoliberal capitalism, local contexts always matter in that it is they that
will ultimately shape the speciﬁc forms in which the (re)appropriation takes
place. Moreover, to fully grasp the sense of injustice that is conveyed by the
expression ‘grabbing’, it is important to keep in mind the particular histories of
dispossession that characterise a speciﬁc place. For this, we need to turn our
attention to the agrarian question in post-apartheid South Africa.
Hitherto South African land reform has had meagre and even controversial
results, with the deadline for redistributing 30% of the land postponed to 2025,
thousands of restitution claims yet to be settled or recently reopened and almost
1.7 million people evicted from commercial farms between 1984 and 2004.10
Yet it is so full of symbolic meanings (such as restorative justice and national
identity) that it cannot simply be put aside.11 It is not all about land, however.
The contemporary agrarian question has been rephrased to ask whether and how
a comprehensive agrarian reform can contribute to solving the extreme poverty
(both in rural areas and in slum settlements around cities) and growing inequal-
ity characterising the country.12
The conversion of commercial farms from traditional activities like crop and
livestock production to wildlife production (eco-tourism, hunting, venison produc-
tion, game breeding and trading) represents an important land-use change in the
agrarian landscape that has prompted the emergence of a critical scholarship in
recent years.13 Some authors do not hesitate to interpret farm conversion as a local
manifestation of green grabbing on the basis of the transformation of wildlife into
a commodity, whose value has been escalating, and of the fact that only the
wealthy can afford to buy game and the large tracts of wilderness it needs.14 This
new practice of land enclosure does indeed seem at odds with the purpose of jus-
tice embedded in the land reform and research has shown how nature conservation
can actually work as a strong moral justiﬁcation to keep both the government and
claimants at bay, at the same time helping white farmers negotiate their new role in
democratic South Africa.15 Other authors, however, have nuanced the discursive
and material contours of the dispossession suffered by the people who live and
work the land without owning it (ie farm workers and dwellers) following the con-
version to game farming.16 Their particular histories of past displacement and
mobility seem in fact to account for whether the conversion is perceived as yet
another round of exclusion or as a decisive rupture.
The lives and experiences of the rural ‘working poor’ thus come to the fore
when we put our analysis of the green economy into agrarian contexts.17 Existing
research on private game farming has indeed focused on the social consequences
that conversion entails for these subjects, especially their tenure and labour rela-
tions. Scholars have found that, contrary to mainstream views about the positive
contribution of private conservation to poverty alleviation,18 game farms offer
fewer job opportunities than traditional ones, the positions offered are usually
low-skilled, and salaries are aligned to those employed in agriculture, which are
the lowest.19 Moreover, the presence of fences and dangerous game affects peo-
ple’s mobility and their ability to keep livestock and access grazing. The loss of
jobs coupled with increasingly difﬁcult living conditions has caused many work-
ers and dwellers to leave the farm voluntarily or forcibly, thus fulﬁlling the idea
that wild nature must be emptied of human presence (or at least of some
humans).20 Displaced workers make for a new group of ‘surplus people’ with no
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other choice than relocating to informal settlements or rural towns.21 It is at this
juncture that a water perspective can provide new insight into the debates dis-
cussed above. Before addressing water issues in more depth, however, the next
section provides an overview of the process of conversion that has been taking
place in the Waterberg.
Producing nature in the Waterberg: from traditional to game farming
Similarly to the rest of South Africa the ﬁrst private nature reserves were
proclaimed by Waterberg landowners in the 1960s.22 However, conservation
activities became common only in the 1980s, following the initiative of some
wealthy white businessmen and farmers, usually self-proclaimed ‘conservation-
ists’ who intended to bring the place back to its ‘original wilderness’. As one of
the landowners that I interviewed put it, she started the reserve to rescue a land
‘destroyed’ by overgrazing and to bring the bush back to its ‘natural’ status.23
At that time the landscape consisted mainly of livestock and crop private
farmland. Cattle farming was the most widespread land use because of the dry
climate and a soil poor in nutrients, alternating rocks and sand. Yet, where
irrigation was possible, that is, along the Mokolo River, sandy soils favoured
the development of tobacco farming, making Vaalwater one of the major
tobacco growing areas of the country to date.
Within a context of deregulation of agriculture – that is, the removal of mar-
keting boards and other state subsidies, which started in the mid-1970s and
accelerated after 199424 – and following the institution of private ownership of
game (via the Game Theft Act, 1991), the conversion of traditional farmland
into private nature reserves and game farms started to make economic sense.25
Only a few landowners were able to fund the conversion, however. The
development of Welgevonden Game Reserve, for instance, albeit initiated in
1987 by the farm owner, Pienkes Du Plessis, was soon taken over by Rand
Merchant Bank. Most of the time it was wealthy individuals from other parts of
the country, or even from abroad, who bought the land from local farmers in
ﬁnancial difﬁculties and then invested their own capital to incorporate more land
from adjoining farms, bring down cattle fences and other farming infrastructure,
introduce game – long disappeared thanks to hunting for trade in the Transvaal
of the 19th century and agriculture thereafter – and to build suitable fences.
Although some of the new owners employed their game-stocked properties as
family hunting farms, a preservationist approach seemed to build momentum in
the 1980s. This was largely promoted by the ﬁgure of Clive Walker, game ranger,
artist and founder of the Endangered Wildlife Foundation, who moved to the pla-
teau around that time. In 1981 Walker found in the businessman Dale Parker an
investor for the purchase of a farm, which was later developed into the 36,000 ha
private nature reserve Lapalala Wilderness. Similarly Walker was able to reach
other ‘like-minded’ people with the means to buy land adjoining Lapalala. Then,
in 1990, he prompted the foundation of the Waterberg Nature Conservancy,
whose ﬁrst members were Lapalala and the two neighbouring game farms
Kwalata Wilderness and Touchstone Game Ranch. The original scope of the
Conservancy was to take all the fences down and transform the Waterberg into
an extensive wilderness, with no human use allowed. This triggered opposition
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from the farming community and the establishment of a frontline between
farmers (mostly Afrikaners) and conservationists (mostly English-speaking)
which, to a large extent, continues to date. Conservationists won an important
battle at the time, as Lapalala disputed and eventually halted the construction of
a government dam on its land – a so-called ‘election dam’, meant to secure
farmers’ votes – to protect the ‘pristine’ Lephalala River system.26
Notwithstanding the Conservancy’s original purposes, more fences have actu-
ally gone up in the course of the years and conservation in the plateau is now
largely managed according to commercial principles. Under the ownership of
Duncan Parker (son of Dale), even Lapalala has started a partnership with busi-
nessmen Gianni Ravazzotti and Peter Anderson; the three of them have devel-
oped a ‘bold’ plan to assure more funding for the reserve activities.27 The plan
includes the following: expanding the already existing special species breeding
project; enhancing tourism; and offering to individuals and companies the
opportunity to invest in the reserve and become ‘custodians’ of the land.
Local authorities are supportive of this shift in the modes of production from
traditional agriculture to green activities and intend to sustain it by developing a
‘Waterberg brand’ that would make the place distinctive and competitive on the
global tourism market.28 The proclamation of the Waterberg Biosphere Reserve
by UNESCO in 2001 also contributed to increasing the international visibility of
the Waterberg, although some locals remain sceptical of the work done on the
ground by the NGO administering it.29
To protect nature while at the same time making a proﬁt out of it has meant
focusing on those conservation activities that can guarantee the highest returns
to landowners. In a relatively small area such as the plateau, with a billboard
advertising a game lodge at every turn of the (dirt) road, this implies catering
for the needs of upper market eco-tourists and overseas hunters, who are willing
to spend up to around ZAR5000 per day – or even ZAR10,000 in the most
exclusive of lodges.30
Besides eco-tourism and trophy hunting, a sub-sector, which has gained
prominence in the past 10 years, is that of game breeding. Snijders has docu-
mented the ‘escalation of commodity value’ of wildlife, whose turnover
increased from ZAR9 million in 1991 to ZAR303 million in 2010.31 More
recently the Deputy President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, who owns a
game farm in the district, hit the headlines for bidding ZAR19.5 million for a
buffalo cow.32 Although some insiders do not hesitate to qualify it as a market
bubble, ready to burst at any time, investors keep trading in live game (espe-
cially rare and exotic species), attracted by a return of 300% or even 400%.33
Small ranchers, who start afresh in the wildlife industry, keep the demand for
common game high (sometimes supplied by livestock farmers diversifying their
activities), whereas big players provide the individual or corporate capital neces-
sary to specialise in genetics and to produce game of higher value. Apart from
meat production, which is partly for export, the end-uses of game are mainly
local: wildlife is sold to other farms for trophy and recreational hunting, safaris
and further breeding. On the Waterberg plateau the two reserves which have
made breeding their core business and are now in a position to organise their
own auctions are Keta Private Game Reserve and Shambala Game Reserve,
both owned by white South African millionaires.34 Keta alone made a proﬁt of
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ZAR26 million at its last auction in May 2014.35 Not only have game auctions
surpassed cattle ones in frequency and sale volume, but they have also become
an important social event for Waterberg landowners. One can immediately
recognise an auction day by the unusually high number of cars – plus a few
helicopters – parked on the side of the tar road. In principle, all local families
can afford the opportunity to admire fancy animals, such as black impalas and
golden gnus – kept in pens though, not roaming ‘freely’ in the bush; neverthe-
less, apart from black workers, white and khaki dominate the landscape.
Another trend, which has (re)emerged in the past 10 years, is the increase in
the number of reserves and farms for the private use of landowners, sometimes
in the form of wildlife estates. Here, the commodiﬁcation of wilderness occurs
through the valuation of converted land, which creates new investment
opportunities for the well-to-do. There may be situations where a landowner rents
out a small cottage to weekend tourists or starts a breeding project, but only to
make an extra income, since he or she does not need to make a living out of the
land. In the Waterberg, those who own a game farm or a portion of a wildlife
estate for the purpose of spending weekends, enjoying an early retirement or
even starting a family in close contact with ‘nature’ constitute a diversiﬁed
group.36 Generally speaking, however, they tend to be white and use English as
a medium of communication. The closeness (in terms of South African distances)
of the plateau to Johannesburg international airport has turned the place into a
haven for foreigners eager to buy their own ‘piece of paradise’ and prompted by
a favourable exchange rate. The majority of foreign landowners come from
Europe, but some travel from as far as the USA to spend a week or two every
year in their bush home. Besides practical considerations, such as its being close
to Gauteng, malaria-free and much cheaper than the Cape, what makes the pla-
teau attractive to potential overseas buyers is that it matches quite well their ideas
of wild Africa as an ‘empty’ land. This is not to say that there are no people liv-
ing in the area, of course, but as long as white people stay on their secluded
farms and black people are gathered in one location – instead of being scattered
all over the place – the illusion is preserved. Moreover, this contributes to the
perception of a safe countryside compared with other parts of South Africa.37
A useful indicator of the upsurge in the demand for game farms as private
residential land is the composition of the Waterberg Nature Conservancy mem-
bership. The number of Conservancy members who own land for private use
only doubled between 2002 and 2010, amounting to 16, or 40% of the total.38
This change is reﬂected in the Conservancy activities – often described by non-
members as an ‘exclusive, wealthy, English-speaking club’39 – now revolving
around a general meeting held once every two months where, in addition to
housekeeping matters, a guest speaker gives a talk on something broadly related
to environmental conservation.
Eventually the uplift of the local community (read blacks) has made it on to
the agenda of the Conservancy and of other green economy businesses in the
Waterberg. Besides the usual rhetoric of helping the poor by creating new jobs –
particularly questionable in the case of game breeding and residential develop-
ments – this has implied the establishment of a few charities.40 It is not to deny
the good done by such initiatives to note that, by giving back just a little to the
community, without putting its ‘poverty and disease’ in relation to the history
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and political economy of the place,41 the unequal distribution of resources in the
area never comes into question and ends up being reinforced.42 Access to water
offers a clear example of this.
Following water through farms and town
During the colonial and apartheid times the Waterberg’s landscape was actively
produced to accommodate the needs of a small class of white commercial farm-
ers. Its water resources (both surface and underground) were therefore appropri-
ated by landowners, who used them according to the following hierarchy: their
produce, their own reproduction, and that of their workers. The small town of
Vaalwater was founded at the beginning of the 20th century as a service point
for the local farming community. Following the 1931 Transvaal Townships and
Town-planning Ordinance, based on the principle of racial segregation, urban
planning provided for water being supplied from the nearby Mokolo River, as
long as this would not undermine the irrigation rights of riparian farms.43
Plans for the establishment of a township for ‘non-Europeans’ were dis-
cussed in 1948, but nothing was implemented; since Vaalwater was located in
the midst of European farmers, the landscape was to be cleared of black pres-
ence too. In 1965 the town was declared a ‘whites-only’ area on the basis of the
Group Areas Act, 1950 and black residents were displaced to the Bantustan of
Lebowa.44 It was only in 1996 that the newly elected African National Congress
(ANC) government authorised the foundation of the township of Leseding, by
providing the ﬁrst RDP (state-subsidised) houses. Some blacks relocated there
from white farms because they were tired of living on someone else’s land,
prone to their baas’s (master) abuses, whereas for those living in the rural vil-
lages of Lebowa the township offered more opportunities in terms of jobs and
services (such as schools, shops and the clinic). However, many did not choose
to live in Leseding, they simply did not have any alternative. Feeling threatened
by the perspective of an imminent land reform, some white farmers loaded their
trucks with their workers’ families and moved them to the township. Other
black families living on white land were evicted when the elderly – the only
ones who were still working the land – could not work anymore or when the
property was sold and converted into a game farm.
As those Leseding residents who were children in the mid-1990s started to
have their own families, and foreign migrants (from Zimbabwe and Mozambique),
who became instrumental in the economy of the region as a pool of cheap labour
on crop and cattle farms, started to arrive, the demand for water services in town
increasingly exceeded the supply, to the point that today residents suffer from
severe water shortages.45 Table 1 provides a description of water access in the
Waterberg, by considering how many hours per day water is actually running
through taps and how many litres of water per day a person is able to consume for
domestic uses. The data show how water access is highly unequal and ultimately
dependent upon settlement patterns, namely whether one resides in the former
white suburbs, in the township, or on a private game farm.
Two issues in relation to the data need to be clariﬁed. First, the striking
difference in water access between suburbs and township (both served by
Modimolle Local Municipality (MLM)46) is explained by better water infrastruc-
ture in the suburbs coupled with many of their residents having the means to drill
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a borehole in their yard or buy a 15,000-litre water tank. Second, the even more
striking difference between town and game farms is explained in part by the fact
that trying to focus only on the domestic uses of water on farms, for the purpose of
comparing them with those in town, turns out to be an almost impossible task,
because water consumption on the former is rarely metered and the same source is
normally used for several activities at the same time. Moreover, water infrastruc-
ture serving the needs of owners, managers and tourists can be very different from
that supplying farm workers.
If coping with water shortages in town may ultimately be seen as a matter of
individual capacity of storing water for personal consumption, then in Leseding
residents can rarely afford the luxury of a water tank and have to rely on more
mundane containers, hence the far inferior amounts of water they are able to
consume. The dependence on containers is already evident in Extension 1 and 2,
where RDP houses are provided with in-house and yard taps, respectively and
residents have to be ready to collect water whenever it comes, but it becomes
all the more urgent in the other four extensions of the township, which are pro-
vided only with communal taps. Here, access to water actually means waking
up at 4 am or 5 am to start queuing at the tap, hoping that water will last until
your turn comes.
The mainstream narrative among those who do not live in town and do have
secure water access maintains that such problems are the direct result of the
municipality’s lack of capacity coupled with continuous inﬂuxes of illegals ‘who
were never meant to be there’.47 However, my argument is that a major redis-
tribution of people – mainly black farm workers becoming superﬂuous to the
economic needs of white farming and inimical to the whites’ politics of place
based on nature conservation – has not been followed by an adequate redistribu-
tion of resources that would satisfy basic human needs, such as safe and con-
tinuous water access. The sense of injustice conveyed by this – and seen in the
light of the history of dispossession of the place – is clearly not shared by
everyone. In the imagination of white landowners the fences demarcating their
private property act as a border separating the world of the farm from that of
town. Anything happening outside a private fence automatically becomes the
municipality’s responsibility. No relationships are drawn between worlds so far
apart, except an emotional response (translating into charity initiatives) to the
stark contrast between abundance and deprivation characterising the place.
Instead, I contend that such relationships between people and space exist and it
is important to trace them, hence to follow water through farms and town.
Table 1. Access to water in the Waterberg.
Typology of settlement Water availability (hrs/d) Water consumption (l/c/d)
Vaalwater suburbs 9 195
Leseding Ext #1 2 26
Leseding Ext #2 2 46
Leseding Ext #3 3 32
Leseding Ext #4 4 26
Leseding Ext #5 4 27
Leseding Ext #6 3 22
Game farms/private nature reserves 24 606
Source: data from structured and semi-structured interviews with 90 residents.
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From the perspective of the local municipality, water supply in Vaalwater
cannot be increased for two main reasons. First, water sources are to be found
on private land and landowners – especially irrigation farmers – ﬁght hard to
keep control over their ‘existing lawful uses’.48 For instance, although there are
landowners whose water allocation exceeds their current needs, and who are
keen on making a proﬁt by renting their boreholes to the municipality, they may
face opposition from other farmers, who think their own activities will be put at
risk.49 Second, a large part of the water resources of the plateau, collected in the
Mokolo Dam (about 60 km to the north of Vaalwater), have been earmarked for
other national ‘strategic’ uses. In fact, this dam is intended to supply water to
the new Eskom Medupi Power Station, a massive coal plant near the town of
Lephalale, which is expected to solve the country’s energy crisis.50
Up to now private nature conservation has tended to remain in the back-
ground of the South African water debate. I think it is time to bring this impor-
tant land-use change and its relationship to water resource to the fore. I will
start by looking at three speciﬁc ways in which game farms actively reproduce
water inequality in the Waterberg both materially and discursively.
First, in the National Water Act, 1998 (NWA) – the cornerstone of the post-
apartheid water legislative framework – water is declared ‘a natural resource that
belongs to all people’ under public trusteeship and the notion of water rights is
replaced with that of water uses, which need to be regulated by the state via
registration and licensing.51 However, game farmers – similarly to traditional
farmers – do not conceive water as a public or common good, which can be
redistributed to accommodate the needs of all, but rather as a private one that
they rightfully appropriated when purchasing the land. The fact that they do not
receive a service from the municipality, but have to provide water for
themselves, by pumping it out of a river or a borehole, reinforces their percep-
tion of private ownership over this natural resource. Since water is ‘theirs’,
game farmers also feel that they can legitimately do anything they want with it.
For instance, they can prevent any extraction from 88 km of river shoreline for
conservation purposes, such as in the case of Lapalala Wilderness. Most of the
time, however, they do extract water and, especially when offering eco-tourism
services, this goes well beyond the satisfaction of basic needs. A ‘wild’ experi-
ence in the bush in fact seems inconceivable without running taps, toilets con-
nected to a sewage system (mostly a septic tank) and amenities such as
swimming pools, Jacuzzis and private dams.
Second, given the Department of Water and Sanitation’s (DWS) narrow
focus on irrigation,52 private conservation activities have not been targeted for
the purpose of regulating water uses and redressing past inequalities in water
allocation. As a result, game farms and private nature reserves know very little
about Water Use Licensing, Registration and Revenue Collection (WARMS) and
usually do not register their water use, apply for a licence or pay water fees.
Two narratives are employed by game farmers to justify their exemption.
On the one side, game farmers claim to use little water – that is, in compar-
ison to irrigation farmers. However, most of them do not monitor their water
consumption and therefore cannot support their claims with actual ﬁgures. They
do not see the point of installing a water meter, since they have water in
abundance and do not need to pay for what they consume. In my research I
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tried together with game farm owners and managers to calculate – usually on
the basis of educated guesses – what their average daily water consumption
was. The extreme results are quite interesting: a small (3000 ha) farm with three
permanent residents (two owners and one staff member) and the capacity to
accommodate up to 12 guests (generally over weekends) would consume around
1000 l/d, whereas a big (34,000 ha) reserve with 350 permanent residents on
average (guests and staff) would consume around 275,000 l/d.53 A number of
factors contribute to explain this difference, namely: farm size; the number of
permanent residents; the game species present (and whether the farmer waters
them during the dry winter months); and the types of activity conducted
(whether the farmer grows lucerne to feed the game, irrigates lawns, offers tour-
ists horse riding safaris or even the possibility of playing golf). The point here
is that water does turn out to be a strategic resource for game farms, too.
Indeed, checking the availability of water sources before the purchase of a prop-
erty is as important as checking for possible land claims. Nonetheless, there is a
serious lack of data about the quantities of water actually consumed. Further-
more, in the absence of a clear deﬁnition of ‘small volumes’ – the threshold for
registration and licensing, according to DWS – the initiative to approach the
Department is left to the discretion of individual landowners, who usually do
not want any government interference in their activities for fear of losing what
they perceive as ‘their’ water and ending up paying more taxes.
On the other side, game farmers maintain that – again, since they do not irri-
gate – they employ water only for domestic purposes and therefore fall within
the category of Schedule 1 water uses, that is, permissible uses according to the
NWA. Nevertheless, the Act reads ‘A person may, subject to this Act take water
for reasonable domestic use in that person’s household, directly from any water
resource to which that person has lawful access’,54 whereas on game farms
water often becomes an essential component of a commercial service (think of
eco-tourism or game trading) and therefore in need of authorisation.
Finally, not only does the conversion to game farming de facto reproduce a
system whereby land ownership (instead of citizenship) discriminates between
those who can access water and those who cannot, but it is also and deliberately
naturalising the inequality ensuing from it. For instance, game farmers tend to
oppose the physical redistribution of water on the basis of a natural limit,
namely the hydrogeology of the Waterberg. Since aquifers are scattered
unevenly across the plateau, they argue, it is only natural that some properties
have a reliable water supply, while others do not. To transfer water from
secluded farms into town would be practically and economically unfeasible and,
above all, it would represent a blatant attack on private property rights.55 In
addition, foreign landowners seem to understand inequality as a natural feature
of the South African landscape, so that the fact that (black) people in town have
to queue at a tap at dawn in order to ﬁll a bucket, whereas (white) people on a
farm can enjoy water in abundance is simply perceived as ‘the way things
are’.56 What is deeply problematic about these perspectives is not only their
total lack of empathy for the living conditions of the majority of the local pop-
ulation of the Waterberg, but in particular their unravelling of a project of social
production of space, whereby the place is valued and marketed as an unspoilt
wilderness, whereas the presence of a growing mass of working poor and
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destitute people dependent upon social grants is perceived as highly unnatural
and their water needs are disputed.
Conclusion
In this article I have questioned the mainstream view according to which game
farms are saving water resources in the Waterberg (as opposed to irrigated crop
farms) and have no relationship to the water problems in Vaalwater (caused by
municipal inefﬁciency), while showing how green economy initiatives contribute
to the reproduction and legitimation of inequality in access to water for local
users. Indeed, some of those rural poor who suffer water shortages in the town-
ship of Leseding come from farms that were at some point converted into
‘wilderness’. By moving – or being moved – into town, people have lost access
to a secure, albeit limited, water supply. The point here is not whether municipal
ofﬁcials can deliver the limited resources at their disposal more efﬁciently. This
is rather being used as a pretext to shift attention away from what is really at
stake, namely how the citizenship rights of the rural poor and their role in the
rural space are shaped by the process of conversion into private nature conserva-
tion. I have argued that nature conservation in the Waterberg is fundamentally
built on the conservation of unequal power relations and this is the main reason
why the redistribution of resources (land and water) is failing.
When framing the debate on water redistribution in terms of unequal power
relations and social production of space – determining who is included and who
is excluded from a place and its resources – it becomes clear that we also need
to take the national level into account. The water question in the post-apartheid
order has become fundamentally political and goes well beyond ‘ﬁxing’ service
delivery in small and under-resourced municipalities. It is the government and
its national department, as custodians of the country’s water resources, which
have the legal and political means to produce change so that water access stops
being a means to perpetuate discrimination among South African citizens. This
calls for new research on both the politics of water redistribution and on the
government’s perception of what constitutes a just and equal society in
contemporary South Africa.
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Notes
1. Waterberg Biosphere Reserve, The Waterberg Meander, 5.
2. According to UNEP’s deﬁnition, a green economy is deemed to enhance economic growth while
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. UNEP, Towards a Green Economy, 16.
3. Hunter, Pioneers of the Waterberg; Taylor et al., The Waterberg; and Walker and Bothma, The Soul of
the Waterberg.
4. See Cullis and van Koppen, Applying the Gini Coefﬁcient; and Woodhouse, “Reforming Land and Water
Rights.”
5. A clear example of dualism is the ‘two economies’ rhetoric. For a political economy critique, see
“Transcending Two Economies”, the special issue of Africanus edited by Bond; and Marais, South
Africa, 193–198.
6. Fairbairn et al., “Introduction.”
7. Fairhead et al., “Green Grabbing”; and Mehta et al., “Introduction.”
8. Büscher, “Letters of Gold”; and Fairhead et al., “Green Grabbing,” 238.
9. Mehta et al., “Introduction.”
10. O’Laughlin et al., “Introduction,” 8; and Wegerif et al., Still Searching for Security, 41.
11. Du Toit, “Real Acts, Imagined Landscapes.”
12. O’Laughlin et al., “Introduction,” 4.
13. Brooks et al., “Creating a Commodiﬁed Wilderness”; and Snijders, “Wild Property.” See also Spierenburg
and Brooks, “Private Game Farming.”
14. Snijders, “Wild Property.”
15. Brandt and Spierenburg, “Game Fences in the Karoo.”
16. Spierenburg and Brooks, “Private Game Farming.”
17. Hall et al., “Farm Workers and Farm Dwellers,” 53.
18. Langholz and Kerley, Combining Conservation and Development.
19. Snijders, “Wild Property”; and Spierenburg and Brooks, “Private Game Farming.”
20. The conversion to game farming is only one of the many complex reasons explaining farm evictions dur-
ing the post-apartheid era. Hall et al. interpret these in relation to overlapping and conﬂicting ‘trajectories
of change’, namely agriculture restructuring and securing tenure for farm workers and dwellers. Hall
et al., “Farm Workers and Farm Dwellers.”
21. Li, “To Make Live”; and Spierenburg and Brooks, “Private Game Farming.”
22. Snijders, “Wild Property,” 506.
23. Personal communication, private nature reserve owner, June 28, 2014.
24. Vink and van Rooyen, The Economic Performance, 4.
25. Snijders, “Wild Property.” The wildlife industry tends to make a distinction between conservation activi-
ties with no commercial purposes (nature reserves) and commercial activities based on the protection,
but at the same time ‘sustainable’ use, of natural resources, such as eco-tourism, hunting and game
breeding (game farms). However, this distinction is now blurring and in this article I employ the terms
interchangeably.
26. Personal communication, local resident, May 9, 2014.
27. http://lapalala.com/the-new-development/, accessed March 4, 2015. Gianni Ravazzotti is the founder of
Italtiles and was ranked among Africa’s 40 Richest by Forbes in 2011. Peter Anderson is CEO of
Anderson Wildlife Properties.
28. Waterberg District Municipality, http://www.waterberg.gov.za/docs/LED%20Brand.pdf, accessed March
2, 2015.
29. Personal communication, game farm manager, May 14, 2014.
30. At the time of writing, ZAR100 = US$8.5.
31. Snijders, “Wild Property,” 512–513.
32. Farmer’s Weekly, May 23, 2012, http://www.farmersweekly.co.za/article.aspx?id=22178&h=Talking-bull-
with-Cyril-Ramaphosa.
33. Personal communication, game farm manager, June 11, 2014.
34. These are Terry McLintock, founder of Canon South Africa, and the insurance magnate Douw Steyn,
respectively.
35. Personal communication, game farm manager, June 11, 2014.
36. On the website of Jembisa, now in the eco-tourism business, one can read that it all started with ‘a fam-
ily who wanted to provide their children with an African ‘“barefoot in the bush” childhood’. See http://
www.jembisa.com/bushhome/the-bush-home/a-family-story.html, accessed March 3, 2015.
37. See Steinberg, Midlands.
38. In 2010 the Conservancy had 40 members in total, whereas in 2014 it had 70. Untitled draft document
personally received from the Biosphere.
39. Personal communication, game farm owner, April 22, 2014.
40. A case in point is the Waterberg Welfare Society, established in 2000 by two local residents with the
support of the Wilson Foundation, the charitable organisation of the American interior designer of luxury
hotels, Trisha Wilson. In an interview Wilson commented: ‘22 years ago, I was awarded the Palace of
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the Lost City project in South Africa’s Sun City. That began my love affair with Africa […] I ended up
building a home in the Welgevonden game reserve. I became a member of the community, although I
only visited there ﬁve weeks each year. You can’t live in those communities and know those beautiful
people and not get involved in ﬁghting the poverty and disease.’ Interior Design, June 18, 2013, http://
www.interiordesign.net/articles/detail/34576-10-qs-with-trisha-wilson/.
41. Ibid.
42. See Ramutsindela et al., Sponsoring Nature.
43. National Archives of South Africa, TRB 2/1/651 124/0/65.
44. Black town residents were moved to the village of Steilloop, whereas farm workers were allowed to live
on white farms and a few in a hostel in Vaalwater. National Archives of South Africa, HKN 1/1/19
HN9/15/3, TRB 217 4/0/65; and Rogerson and Letsoalo, “Resettlement and Under-development,” 182.
45. According to the Census 2011, Vaalwater ‘town’ had a population of 3964 people and Leseding of
12,499. However, in 2012, the Vaalwater clinic registered a total population of 28,385 people. At the
time of my research, water services were sourced from eight boreholes, which were bought or rented by
the municipality along the years, with a total yield of 1.2 mega-litres per day.
46. MLM is both water service authority and service provider in Vaalwater. Although Modimolle town is 60
km distant to the south, Vaalwater was included in the municipality’s borders following the new munici-
pal demarcation process in 2000.
47. Personal communication, game farm owner, December 10, 2013.
48. These can be seen as the water equivalent of the constitutional property clause. However, following the
phases of registration, validation, and veriﬁcation, such uses are supposed to be granted (or denied) a
water licence. Republic of South Africa, National Water Act, Chapter 1, Section 32.
49. Furthermore, the municipality ﬁnds it difﬁcult to afford the price asked by farmers.
50. See Bond, “Theory and Practice.”
51. Republic of South Africa, National Water Act.
52. Understandable in light of the fact that irrigation uses 60% of national water resources. DWA, National
Water Resource Strategy, 9.
53. In this second case the reserve manager pointed out that they were very ‘water conscious’ and metered
their water consumption. Also, they were registered with DWS, but did not pay water fees. Personal
communication, game farm manager, November 5, 2013.
54. Republic of South Africa, National Water Act, Schedule 1.
55. One may note that infrastructure development faces hardly any limits on private reserves. Anyway, the
point here is not to suggest that water needs to be physically redistributed but to show how the very idea
of redistribution (of water and consequently land) is opposed. Personal communication, WNC general
meeting, July 3, 2014.
56. Ibid.
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